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An Examination, &c.
The prospects of the country at the present moment, on the opening of a
European war, present many aspects of anxious interest, and afford in-
dications of a revival of many subjects of discussion, as well of an eco-
nomical and financial as of a political character, which have long been
allowed to slumber in silence. Amongst these we may expect to find our
monetary laws pretty severely. canvassed; and it is certain that the ne-
cessity of supporting large military expenditure in foreign countries is a
circumstance of precisely that kind which is likely to bring these laws to
a severe test. We have already parted with some four or five millions of
bullion in discharge of foreign liabilities of one kind or another; and
though the exchanges may have rallied for the present, it is not possible
that the country should carry on its warlike proceedings on the scale
which seems to be contemplated, without becoming subject to occa-4/John E. Cairnes
sional drains of the precious metals of a more extensive character than
we have for many years experienced. The occasion, therefore, seems
not to be unsuitable for inviting public attention to a consideration of
the principles upon which our currency laws are based. These prin-
ciples, so far at least as regards the control of our paper circulation, are
embodied in the Bank Charter Act of 1844. Into all the provisions of
that Act it is not intended in the following observations to enter: the
points which it is proposed to discuss are those only which affect the
central establishment in London; according to which an artificial limit,
prescribed by the legislature, is placed upon the issue of notes payable
on demand.
The projects which have been brought forward at different times for
the regulation of the currency have been various, and the questions which
it involves are still, perhaps, amongst the most vexed within the field of
political economy. Various, however, and conflicting as are the views
entertained by the highest authorities upon many points connected with
the regulation of the currency, the discussion to which the question has
given rise seems yet to have been productive of this one settled conclu-
sion—I allude, of course, to the principle that paper-money should be
made by law payable on demand into the gold which it professes to
represent. I say, settled conclusion; because, though there are undoubt-
edly still some dissentients from this principle, yet it will scarcely be
maintained that their authority is of such weight as to be even capable of
appreciation, though tried in the most delicate balance against the names
which may be adduced in support of the doctrine of “convertibility”;—
Gaines which include all the most distinguished economists in the three
kingdoms, all the first practical financiers, and, I believe, every states-
man of eminence. A principle which, after so long a discussion, such
authorities, so various and independent, have all concurred in adopting,
may, it appears to me, be fairly considered as placed beyond the domain
of “open questions.” I am therefore, I conceive, absolved from the ne-
cessity of re-opening a controversy already, so far as argument and ex-
periment can go, fully decided; nor shall I tax the time and patience of
the reader by entering into an examination of those numerous hopeful
schemes for the regeneration of society, based upon the principle of
“coining the whole land of the country into money” and the like;—great
and comprehensive measures, of which it has been said the process “be-
gins in the vat of the paper mill, and ends in the desk of the counting-
house.”An Examination into the Principles of Currency/5
The changes effected in our monetary system by the act of 1844 are
thus stated by Mr. M’Culloch:—2”Sir Robert Peel adopted, in dealing
with the Bank of England, the proposal made by Mr. Lloyd in 1837, for
effecting a complete separation between the issuing and banking depart-
ments of that establishment. And while the directors are left at liberty to
manage the latter at discretion, their management of the former or issue
department is subjected to what seems to be a well-devised system of
restraint. The Bank is allowed to issue of notes upon securities (of which
the debt of £11,015,100 lent by her to government is a part); and what-
ever paper the issue department may at any time issue over and above
this maximum amount of securities, it must have an equal amount of
coin and bullion in its coffers. Hence it is impracticable for the issue
department to increase its issues, without at the same time proportion-
ally increasing its stock of coin and bullion; or to diminish the latter
without proportionally diminishing the amount of paper supplied to the
public or the bank department.’’
The change is thus twofold; 1st. the separation of the issue and
banking departments, and 2ndly, the restriction of the issue of notes
upon securities to £14,000,000, requiring for all beyond that amount an
equivalent in gold to be held in the coffers of the Bank.
With regard to the separation of departments, I do not know that it
is necessary to make any lengthened remark: it appears not to go beyond
a question of account, and is so understood by Mr. Morris, the Gover-
nor of the Bank of England.3 In point of fact the separation of the ac-
counts took place in the year 1840, four years before the passing of the
Bank Charter Act. A certain amount it of notes was issued against secu-
rities and a certain amount against bullion, and the amounts were kept
as separate as they have been since the act came into force.4
The second and more important provision, however, of the act, which
restricts the issue of notes upon securities to £14,000,000, obliging the
Bank for all beyond that amount to hold an equivalent quantity of gold,
will require a more lengthened discussion.
The theoretical view upon which this regulation proceeds is that, in
a mixed currency like ours, composed partly of coin and partly of notes,
the circulation, to be perfect, should vary in the same way as it would do
if the whole currency were metallic; and this object the framers of the
Act undertook more or less completely to accomplish, by providing that
the amount of notes issued should rise and fall exactly as the treasure in
the coffers of the Bank, (or, in other words, as the gold in the country)6/John E. Cairnes
increased or diminished. Meeting the framers of the Act upon their own
ground, Mr. Fullarton has shown5 that their views and arguments in-
volve an assumption which is quite unfounded in fact; the assumption
that, under a metallic currency, the circulation would vary in amount
with the influx and efflux of gold. He has shown, from the examples of
all those countries where the currency is wholly metallic, or nearly so,
that an export of gold to meet foreign payments is drawn not from the
money in circulation—or at least in a very insignificant proportion from
the money in circulation—but from those hoards which in such coun-
tries are always secreted to a large extent in periods of prosperity when
interest is low, and which the high interest, offered when large foreign
payments are to be made, invariably draws forth in sufficient quanti ties
to meet the demand. The analogy, therefore, which the promoters of the
Act of 1844 aimed at establishing, between the working of our mixed
currency and that of a currency purely metallic, fails completely in the
essential point. For, whereas, under a purely metallic currency, the coin
in the hands of the community would not be diminished to any impor-
tant extent, in the event of a foreign drain of gold, till all the reserve of
unemployed gold in the country was exhausted; the Bank Charter Act,
on the contrary, interdicts the export of a single ounce of gold from the
reserve treasure in the country, (that reserve being? under our system of
currency, in the coffers the Bank of England) unless upon the condition
that an equivalent sum in bank-notes be simultaneously withdrawn from
the circulation. Thus, under the one system, a drain of gold to foreign
countries must exhaust the whole reserve before it reaches the circula-
tion; under the other, it acts immediately and exclusively upon the circu-
lation in the hands of the public. The analogy, therefore, which the framers
of the Act aimed at establishing completely breaks down.
But, even granting the assumption made by the advocates of the
present system with reference to the working of a currency purely me-
tallic, it may still, I think, well be questioned if their theory is carried out
by the act of 1844, at least in any important sense of the words used.
“The efflux and influx of gold,” say Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Norman,6 “are
the only sure tests of what would have been the variations of a circula-
tion purely metallic;” and therefore this constitutes, according to their
views, the proper rule by which to control the fluctuations of a paper
circulation. But what is meant by the term “circulation”? Now, the only
sense in which this term was ever (until quite a recent period) under-
stood in such controversies, was as signifying the bank notes in theAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/7
hands of the public. Since, however, the period of the framing of the
Bank Charter Act, the promoters of that measure have resorted to a new
nomenclature; with a view, as it would appear, of bringing their theory
as to the regulation of the currency into harmony with the operation of
the act. According to them, the term “circulation” includes, besides the
bank notes in the hands of the public, the additional sum held by the
bank as reserve in its banking department: they consider, in fact, as
“circulation,” not only all the notes outside the walls of the bank, but all
the notes within the bank besides. Including this reserve of notes in the
bank, the circulation varies indeed as the bullion varies—this, from the
very terms of the act, is a self-evident proposition. But this sense of the
word “circulation” is, I maintain, a novelty in our nomenclature, intro-
duced by the framers of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, entirely at vari-
ance with the received signification, and perfectly useless except for the
purpose of reconciling a particular theory of the currency with the op-
eration of this measure. “I believe,” says Mr. Tooke,7 “that in all the
pamphlets, in all the evidence, in all the speeches, in which the question
of banking has been discussed, the circulation has been confined to the
notes in the hands of the public.... There was never such a confusion of
reasoning as that which would suppose that the circulation in posse is
part of that circulation which in any way acts upon prices.” The testi-
mony of Mr. Morris,8 Governor of the Bank of England in 1848, is to
the same purpose. He is asked before the Committee on Commercial
Distress, 1848,—
“Would you call the notes held in reserve by the Bank circulation at
all?—No; not according to the usual meaning of the term.
“You would call the notes in the hands of the public real circula-
tion?—The general acceptation of the word “circulation” includes notes
out with the public, whether they are in the pockets of individuals or in
the hands of private bankers.
“But it does not include the bank reserve?—No.
“Are those notes kept actually in reserve, or is it merely a matter of
account?—It is a matter of account; they are paid in and cancelled, as
the Bank does not re-issue notes; when they are called for, fresh notes
are issued against them.”
I am warranted, therefore, in assuming that the term “circulation,”
in the sense in which it has been always understood in controversies of
this kind, stands for the amount of notes in the hands of the public. Now,
in this use of the word, how does the theory of the Bank Charter Act,8/John E. Cairnes
that the circulation should fluctuate in amount with the fluctuations in
the quantity of gold in the country, correspond with the working of the
act? Here is an example taken from a comparison of the years 1846 and
1847:—
Notes with the Bullion in the
Public Bank.
June 6th, 1846 ... £19,857,000 ...£15,012,000.
April 3rd, 1847 ... £19,855,000 ...£10,246,000.
Oct. 3rd, 1846 ... £20,651,000 ...£15,817,000.
Oct. 3rd, 1847 ... £18,712,000 ...£ 8,565,000.9
It appears from a comparison of these figures that, while between
June, 1846, and April, 1847, the variation in the circulation was only to
the extent of £2000, the variation during the same interval in the amount
of treasure was £4,766,000. And while, between October, 1846, and
October, 1847, the variation in the circulation was but £1,839,000, the
variation during the same time in the amount of treasure was £7,252,000.
The act, therefore, in its practical working, is as far from fulfilling
the conditions of the theory which its authors propounded and designed
to give effect to, as this theory is itself destitute of support from facts.
So far with regard to the theoretical aspect of the measure. With
reference, next, to the practical purport of the Bill of 1844, I find it thus
clearly and succinctly set forth in a passage which I have extracted from
a leading article of the Times, October, 1847, and which, as emanating
from an able and uncompronising supporter of the measure, may be
taken as an unexceptionable statement of its objects:—”Peel’s bill,” says
the Times, “provides two checks” (against over-issue of paper) “1st. the
natural one, which was the only check under the old charter, viz. the
Bank’s actual power to fulfil its promise to pay; and 2ndly, the artificial
and arbitrary check which obliges the Bank to keep gold in its coffers
for all its notes beyond £14,000,000... On an average of years it ap-
peared safe to suppose £14,000,000 of notes to be always outstanding,
but not a larger sum.... Under the old charter, the discretion was left to
the directors; under the new, the legislature fixed the rule of prudence.”
I do not stop to inquire whether £14,000,000 is the maximum that
should have been selected, or whether, supposing it to have been justi-
fied by the state of our commercial transactions in 1844, some additionAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/9
might not now be safely made to that sum under the extension which
commerce has since experienced. The question to which I shall address
myself is the one stated by the Times, and which appears to go to the
root of the subject, viz., whether the issue of bank notes can be best left
to the discretion—I will not say necessarily of the bank directors—but
of some competent and judiciously organized body; or whether, as the
Times prefers, and as the Act of 1844 provides, the legislature should
fix ‘the rule of prudence.’
First, then, in what does the perfection of a system of currency
consist, and by what criterion are we to judge of its merits? In ordinary
times, when commence moves along in its regular and natural course,
there is little room for testing the merits of a currency: it must be a bad
system indeed that in quiet times fails to adapt itself to the business
which is required of it. The day of trial does not come till the arrival of
one of those seasons of commercial derangement known as monetary
crises, when accidental and unforeseen causes defeat the reckonings and
disappoint the expectations of mercantile men. It is, I conceive, in its
power of meeting an occasion of this kind—in its capacity of expanding
and contracting or maintaining its level, according to circumstances,
and in such a manner as, while it secures the country against any depre-
ciation from the standard, yet effects this end with the minimum of fluc-
tuation in exchange value, and with the least disturbance to the general
machinery of commerce—that its excellence as a monetary system con-
sists. Now granting for the present, that the regulations of the Act of
1844 are adequate to secure the convertibility of bane notes, and thus to
prevent their depreciation from the standard, there remains the further
question, How far are they fitted for accomplishing the other end of a
good system— the preservation of, as nearly as may be, a uniformity of
value in the circulating medium under such sudden and violent oscilla-
tions as at times occur in the movement of the commercial world?
The value of a circulating medium, convertible on demand into gold,
of course depends in the long run on the cost of obtaining gold; but its
value at any given time, and the fluctuations in its value, are determined
by the quantity which happens to be in circulation, compared with the
functions it has to perform, and its efficiency in performing them:—that
is to say, the value of a circulating medium depends on three distinct
conditions; the quantity of it in circulation; the number of exchanges
which it has to accomplish; and its efficiency, or, as it is called in tech-
nical language, “the rapidity of circulation.” Now, it is over one of these10/John E. Cairnes
circumstances only that we can exercise directly any control. The num-
ber of exchanges to be performed depends upon the state of commerce
in the country; the rapidity of the circulation depends on the commercial
facilities at the disposal of the public, the state of public confidence,
&c.; the only condition that we can control is the quantity, and this, in a
mixed circulation like ours, is done by regulating the issue of bank notes.
If, therefore, it be desirable that the currency be maintained as nearly as
possible at a uniform value, the regulation of the issue of paper money
should be made with constant reference to the other two conditions upon
which its value depends,—that is to say, the number of exchanges tak-
ing place, and the rapidity of circulation; providing, on the one hand,
against any sudden reduction in the amount of notes issued, so long as
the bona tide transactions to be performed remain undiminished, and on
the other, furnishing some mode, on the occurrence of any sudden alter-
ation either in the state of trade or in the state of public confidence, of
compensating for this change by means of a corresponding contraction
or expansion, as the case may be, in the quantity of notes issued. The
principles here indicated are, I believe, generally recognized. Mr.
M’Culloch, for example, (a strong supporter, by the way, of the Bank
Charter Act) thus expresses himself:—10 “The demand for money,” he
says, “differs at different periods. A currency susceptible neither of in-
crease or diminution might be at one time in excess, and at another
deficient, according to the varying state of credit and confidence in the
country, and the nature of its commercial relation with foreigners. It is
therefore of importance to bear in mind, that it is not by the absolute
amount of currency that any correct judgment can be formed whether it
be in excess or not. At one time, an issue of eighteen millions of Bank of
England notes might be probably too great and under other circum-
stances an issue of twenty millions or twenty-five millions might not be
enough.”
Such being the conditions on which the value of a currency de-
pends, and looking to the uncertain and fluctuating character of our
transactions with foreign countries, as well as to the numerous circum-
stances which may affect credit and confidence at home, it appears to
me that any system which, like the act of 1844, takes no account of
these varying circumstances, but substitutes an inflexible rule for dis-
cretionary adjustment, and subjects the control of the paper issue to
regulations prescribed without reference to what may be the state of
trade or of public confidence in particular emergencies, labours underAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/11
an inherent defect, and is calculated in periods of commercial derange-
ment to intensify every cause of disturbance, and to convert pressure
into panic.
The causes which may lead to a monetary crisis are various: over-
trading beyond what the requirements of society may justify; a specula-
tive mania, leading to an imprudent extension of credit; these bring in
their train commercial disturbance, loss, and bankruptcy. With regard
to the influence which the issue of paper-money may exercise upon
monetary crises arising from such causes, I am disposed to think the
notions commonly entertained are greatly exaggerated. The history of
the several crises which have occurred within the last sixty years goes to
show that an increased paper circulation is the consequence, not the
cause, of extravagant speculation and high prices; and the remedy for
such evils is, I conceive, to be found in a greater extension of free trade
principles, and in whatever else conduces to greater certainty and stabil-
ity in the character of commercial transactions, rattler than in currency
regulations. But, whatever may be thought upon this point, it is at least
certain that the facilities supplied by the Bank of England to imprudent
speculation have been greater since the passing of the Bank Charter
Act, than were ever afforded previous to its enactment. There cannot be
a better measure of the facilities afforded to the public in this respect
than the rate of interest. Now, before the passing of the Bank Charter
Act, in times of the greatest speculative excitement, as for example in
the year 1825, the Bank never lowered its rate of interest below 4 per
cent; on the contrary, after the act had become law, the Bank reduced its
rate of interest to 2 per cent; thereby undoubtedly encouraging, as far as
undue banking accommodation was capable of encouraging, the numer-
ous bubble schemes, principally railway projects of various kinds, which
sprang up so exuberantly at that time, and by their absorption of the
ordinary floating capital of the country added so considerably to the
difficulties of the subsequent year. Indeed, this is one of the counts in the
indictment which the Lords’ Committee of 1848, in their report, bring
against the conduct of the Bank of England.
It will not be necessary longer to dwell on monetary crises arising
from causes of this kind; it is sufficient for my purpose to point out that
the Bank Charter Act has not opposed the slightest restraint to the specu-
lative spirit in which they originate, but, on the contrary, is consistent
with the most unbounded extension of it.
There are, however, other causes of commercial disturbance to which12/John E. Cairnes
it will be necessary more particularly to advert, both because they are of
a kind to which the present state of our relations with foreign countries
renders us more immediately liable, and because they arise out of cir-
cumstances to which the regulations of the law of 1844 seem to be pecu-
liarly inapplicable.
A monetary crisis may be occasioned not only by such incidents as
have been alluded to—over-trading, and undue use of credit by mer-
chants and other speculative persons—but also by circumstances which
are in their nature quite unavoidable, or at least which only be avoided
at the expense of evils still more formidable than any extent of mere
commercial loss. The country, for example, may be called upon to sup-
port large military expenditure abroad; or to pay for large additional
imports of food; or other occurrences of a like character may happen; or
several of these may concur. Now, in such cases, if the extent of our
payments to foreign countries should exceed what our ordinary exports
can at the moment discharge, a necessity will arise for remitting the
balance in gold; and, if this balance be considerable, the consequence
will be a severe pressure upon the money market, resulting, perhaps, in
a monetary crisis.
This is a source of commercial derangement which the political con-
dition of Europe at present gives us too much reason to apprehend,
more particularly if anything like a short harvest at home should happen
to coincide with a drain upon our resources, occasioned by extraordi-
nary foreign military expenditure. It is, therefore of importance to show
what provision Sir Robert Peel’s Act makes for meeting such a contin-
gency.
The provisions of the act are, that £14,000,000 of notes only are to
be issued on securities; the amount issued beyond that sum depending
upon the amount of gold in the coffers of the bank. It consequently
follows that in the event of its being necessary to export gold to meet
demands for foreign payments, the act would require that an equal amount
of notes should be struck off the circulation; that is to say, that if ten
millions of gold be sent abroad to pay for necessary expenses, ten mil-
lions of notes also should be cancelled. Now, it is to be observed, that
while this large quantity of gold is being exported to foreign countries,
there would be nothing unwarrantable in supposing that all the other
monetary transactions of the community might be going on as usual, or
nearly so. The gold exported, having been before lying inactive in the
cellars of the bank, was not operating as productive capital; even if itAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/13
should be considered as so much abstracted from the effective capital of
the country, yet a deduction of ten millions from the currency of the
country, is far more than an equivalent proportion to the same sum de-
ducted from the capital of the country. Supposing, for example, that the
total capital of the country was five hundred millions, and the currency
fifty millions (the disparity between them being, in fact, probably much
greater), ten millions deducted from each would reduce the capital of
the country but two per cent, while it would reduce the currency twenty
per cent. It is evident, therefore, that whether we consider the ten mil-
lions of gold which; by the hypothesis, is sent abroad to pay foreign
debts, to be a deduction from the effective capital of the country or not,
a contraction of the currency to the same extent is a contraction alto-
gether disproportioned to whatever diminution such export of gold may
be supposed to occasion in the legitimate bona fide dealings transacted
at home. There is, in fact, nothing in the mere circumstance of the trans-
mission of gold from the cellars of the Bank of England to foreign coun-
tries—considered in itself, and apart from artificial regulations—to in-
terfere materially with the ordinary routine of commercial proceedings.
Productive capital may still seek its accustomed channels; industry pur-
sue its wonted task; consumption may proceed unchecked, or, if checked
at all, only in proportion to the advance in prices; in a word, while these
large additions are being made to the foreign payments of the nation, the
functions which the currency has to perform at home may continue with-
out serious abatement.
It thus appears that, in the event of the occurrence of such contin-
gencies as we have been considering,— large military expenditure in
foreign countries, unusual importations of food to supply the defects of
a short harvest, and other circumstances of a similar description,—while
all the ordinary internal exchanges of the country may be proceeding
without material alteration, the circulating medium in which these ex-
changes are to be transacted would, by the act of 1844, be subjected to
a sudden and extraordinary contraction. It is further to be remembered
that, in such times as we are supposing—times of pressure upon the
money market—the confidence of mercantile men in the stability of those
with whom they do business, is never so implicit as when trade is in its
normal state. Tradesmen in such times cease to give their usual credit,
and consequently the reduced circulation would have increased func-
tions to perform; both circumstances acting in the same direction, and
tending greatly, according to the principles which have been already14/John E. Cairnes
laid down, to enhance its value.
Now, when we consider the vast number of routine payments regu-
larly transacted in London alone, absorbing, as I believe they do, a large
proportion of the whole Bank of England circulation; when we consider
their imperative character, and the consequences of the slightest failure
in a single engagement, it must be plain that a sudden and extensive
reduction in the means of making these payments,—a sudden and
unlooked-for enhancement in the value of the medium in which these
engagements are to be discharged,— must lead to violent convulsions in
what may he considered the heart of our monetary system. And when
we further bear in mind the numerous ramifications of commercial rela-
tions throughout the country, and the intimate connexion between each
and the centre of the circulation, it must be equally evident that any
serious disturbance originating in the metropolis cannot fail to extend
itself, and to produce grave and disastrous consequences amongst the
general community.
It is no doubt an evil that the country should be obliged to send
abroad valuable things of any sort to meet, for example, the necessary
expenses of war, for which no return, at least no material return. This,
however, is inevitable from the very nature of war, which means de-
struction and not production. But it seems a great and needless aggrava-
tion of this evil, that the law should be such as to render it impossible to
discharge this necessary debt, without at the same time subjecting the
circulating medium at home to such an extraordinary and gratuitous
contraction, as must convulse the whole commercial community, and
derange the entire machinery of our monetary system.
But it may be said, and this is the view of those who dictated the act
of 1844, that, granting the reality of the evils adverted to, (for they
cannot be denied) yet this is the price we must pay for securing the
convertibility of our notes. “If you allow a certain amount of treasure,”
says Mr. Norman,11 “to leave the Bank without any contraction, that
treasure would become a part of the currency of other nations, and it
will there remain; there is no reason why it should come back at all; it
never can come back unless a contraction really takes place. Assum-
ing it to be the case that it never comes back, in the course of a few years
you have another drain, and if the vacuum is again supplied by the
issues of paper here, that gold will not come back; so that, upon that
principle, there is no conceivable amount of reserve which you might
not part with.” “Unless contraction of the paper money,” says Mr.An Examination into the Principles of Currency/15
Lloyd,12 “corresponding to the drain upon the bullion, be resorted to,
there can be no security in any course of action, and for this obvious
reason: if the paper currency of this country be suffered to be depreci-
ated in reference to the value of the currencies of other countries, even
to a very slight extent, and if that depreciation be perpetuated by con-
stantly keeping the amount of paper notes undiminished, upon that sup-
position, an amount of gold equal to the whole paper circulation, or
even exceeding it, may be drained out.” “Bullion,” says Mr. M’Culloch,13
“like other commodities, is exported only when its exportation is profit-
able. The fact that the exchange has fallen, and that bullion is being
exported, proves incontestably that the currency is redundant; and that,
consequently, the directors of the Bank of England should immediately
set about contracting their issues to prevent the exhaustion of their cof-
fers.”
These are the views which suggested the regulations of the Bank
Charter Act; and if they correctly represented all the causes which regu-
late the efflux and influx of the precious metals, the arguments which I
have quoted would, to any one who regarded the convertibility of bank
notes as a condition of primary importance, be decisive in favour of that
Act. But I think it may be doubted all the essential circumstances affect-
ing the distribution of the precious metals are here taken into account. It
is of course necessary to speak with great caution on a question on
which some high authorities have expressed an opinion different from
mine; hut if the matter were to be determined by an appeal to eminent
names, the preponderance of authority would, I conceive, be still in
favour of the view advocated in these pages. As this is a question, how-
ever, to be decided by an appeal to facts and principles rather than to
names, instead of confronting the passages I have quoted with other
passages of a contrary tendency from authorities of equally high stand-
ing (as I might easily do)14 I shall venture, though with considerable
diffidence, to examine the question upon independent grounds.
And first I shall refer to a matter of fact. Mr. Norman says that
gold, in the event of a foreign drain, “can never come back, unless a
contraction of the currency really take place.” The answer to which
assertion is, that during the last war the experiment was frequently tried,
and the gold in every instance did come back, not only without any
contraction having taken place, but even while the circulation was un-
dergoing a considerable enlargement.
In Mr. Tooke’s History of Prices (vol. 1, p. 157,) he remarks upon16/John E. Cairnes
a circumstance to which he invites especial attention, the circumstance,
namely, “that, while the amount of bank issues was, from 1797 to 1817,
undergoing, with trifling exceptions, a progressive increase, the ex-
changes, upon every pause from the pressure of extraordinary foreign
payments, tended to a recovery; and when the pressure had entirely
ceased, the exchanges and the price of gold were restored to par, while
the bank circulation was larger in amount that at any preceding period.”
So much for the general fact as given on the authority of Mr. Tooke.
Referring now, for the sake of particular illustration, to the returns of
the Bank of England circulation, bullion, &c. as given in the Appendix
to the Report from the Committee on the Bank of England Charter,
1833, and looking to these returns from the year 1808 to the year 1817,
during which interval the largest foreign war expenditure ever under-
taken by this country took place, I find that the circulation
In Aug. 1808, amounted to £17,111,290, bullion £6,015,940
In Aug. 1809, 19,675,180, 3,652,480
In Aug. 1810, 24,793,990, 3,191,850
In Aug. 1811, 23,286,850, 3,243,300
In Aug. 1812, 23,026,880, 3,099,270
In Aug. 1813, 24,828,120, 2,712,270
In Aug. 1814, 28,368,290, 2,097,680
In Aug. 1815, 27,248,620, 3,409,040
In Aug. 1816, 26,758,720, 7,562,780
In Aug. 1817, 29,543,780,   11,668,260
Thus it appears that the circulation, which in August, 1808, stood
at the sum of about 17 millions, rose by tolerably regular steps, till in
the August of 1817 it reached the amount of nearly 30 millions; while
during the same period the bullion in the Bank, which, under the action
of foreign payments, fell at one time (August, 1814) so low as nearly to
£2,000,000, yet in spite of a constantly increasing circulation, com-
pletely recovered from this foreign drain; so that in the year 1817, when
the notes in circulation amounted to nearly £30,000,000, the bullion in
the Bank had reached 11,500,000; these sums being, respectively, the
maximum amounts which the circulation and bullion had ever reached
up to that time. It is indeed somewhat remarkable that it was just at this
time, when after a rapid increase of paper issue; the circulation had just
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rations from this standard, fell almost to par; while the treasure in the
Bank had at the same time become so abundant, that about this time, (in
the months of April and September, 1817) the Bank Directors under-
took by public notice to pay, and actually did pay, a large proportion of
their notes in coin, amounting, it has been estimated, to about
£5,000,000.15
A further negative to the doctrine laid down so peremptorily by Mr.
Norman and Mr. Lloyd, is afforded by the state of the treasure and
circulation respectively of the Bank of France between 1845 and 1847.
The figures which I am about to quote are taken from a return handed in
by Mr. Tooke to the House of Commons Committee on Commercial
Distress, 1848 (p. 422–3).
Quarter ended Circulation and bullion.
25th Mar. 1845, ... 256,000,000 francs ... 266,000,000 francs.
26th Dec. 1845, ... 269,000,000 francs ... 187,334,000 francs.
26th Dec. 1846, ... 259,459,000 francs ... 72,734,000 francs.
25th Mar.1847, ... 249,404,000 francs ... 79,535,000 francs.
The Bank of France thus, between March, 1845, and March, 1847,
parted with bullion to the amount of in round numbers 193,000,000
francs, or £7,500,000, (just about the same sum as the Bank of England
parted with during the same period) while the circulation underwent no
reduction worth speaking of. The rate of interest, too, was only raised
from 4 to 5 per cent. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, the for-
eign drain was satisfied, and the gold returned.
These two examples from the history of the national banks of En-
gland and France, in two most important conjunctures, might, perhaps,
be considered as furnishing a sufficient reply to that school of financiers
who assert the interminable nature of drains, and the necessity of a con-
traction of the circulation as an essential condition in order to secure the
return of gold to the country. The doctrine, however, is of such funda-
mental importance in currency questions, that it may be desirable to
examine it more fully and upon general grounds.
The question is, in fact, one as to the circumstances by which the
distribution of the precious metals among the different nations of the
world is governed. The doctrine laid down by Mr. Norman, Mr. Lloyd,
and Mr. M’Culloch, refers the movements of the precious metals exclu-
sively to the state of the currencies of countries having commercial rela-18/John E. Cairnes
tions with each other. This is not stated in terms, but the assertion that
adverse exchanges invariably indicate a redundant currency, the asser-
tion that gold when once exported can only be drawn back into the
country by means of an action upon the circulation, evidently imply this
doctrine.
Now it appears to me that this theory is quite incomplete; that it
attributes an altogether undue importance to the influence of the circu-
lation upon the movements of the precious metals, and that it overlooks
entirely the operation of other causes which are at least equally impor-
tant in their bearing upon the phenomena.
It is admitted, I believe, on a hands, that the efflux and influx of
gold are in all cases ultimately governed by the relation between our
exports and imports; it is, therefore, as operating upon this relation,
stimulating exportation and checking importation, that the contraction
of the circulation is insisted upon as an essential condition of the return
of gold. The doctrine is, that a reduced circulation has the effect of
lowering prices; that low prices act as an inducement to merchants to
export more freely, and to import more sparingly; that foreigners thus
became indebted to us, and that, in payment of their debts, the gold is
brought back to the country.
My objection to this theory is that, though true as far as it goes, it is
incomplete. It is true that the tendency of a reduced circulation is to
lower prices; it is true that a fall in prices does, within certain limits,
operate as a stimulus exportation and a a discouragement to importa-
tion; but it is not true that the motives to importation and exportation
depend upon prices alone; and, should the fall in prices be very sudden
and violent, I conceive its effect on the whole would be rather
unfavourable than otherwise on the exportation of commodities.
Upon what, then, does the state of our exports and imports depend?
Doubtless, a most important condition is the state of prices in this as
compared with other countries. But this plainly is not the only circum-
stance affecting the question. The quantity of foreign goods, the quan-
tity of tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, wine, and the like, which we import
from foreign countries, does not depend solely upon the prices at which
these commodities are to be purchased; it depends quite as much on the
means at the disposal of people in this country for the procurement of
such articles. If there should be a bad season at home, or a deficient
harvest, or if there were a failure in the raw materials of any of our
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render industry less profitable, or to diminish the general wealth of the
country, the means at the disposal of the community for the purchase of
foreign commodities would be curtailed. Without supposing any alter-
ation in prices, therefore, the demand for such commodities would de-
cline, and consequently the amount of our imports would fall off. And,
conversely, if the opposite conditions should occur, if the wealth of the
country were to increase, we should each on an average have more to
spend; a portion of this increased wealth, without necessarily supposing
any fall in prices abroad, would go in extra demand for foreign com-
modities; and our imports would consequently increase. It thus seems
plain that any circumstance which has the effect of enriching or impov-
erishing the community, must operate in augmenting or diminishing the
amount of goods which we import from abroad ; and what takes place
here will of course take place equally in foreign countries. It follows,
therefore, that the relation between our exports and imports, and, by
consequence, the influx and efflux of gold, depends not only on the state
of prices here and abroad, but also on the means of purchase which are
at the command, respectively, of home and foreign consumers. It is quite
conceivable, therefore, without supposing any alteration in the prices of
commodities, and consequently without the necessity of any contraction
of the circulation,—it is quite conceivable, that the relation between our
exports and imports may be altered, and consequently the exchanges
adjusted, simply in consequence of a change having taken place in the
comparative wealth of this and other countries. Now, such a change
takes places whenever any of the causes come into operation which I
have referred to,—for example, when the harvest fails at home, or when
the staple of any of our manufactures is deficient, or when large military
expenditure is to be supported abroad; in short, when any of the ordi-
nary causes occur which require this country to export gold. The trans-
ference of so much gold from this country to foreign countries—though
it need not interfere to any great extent with the proceedings of com-
merce at home—yet alters the disposable wealth comparatively of this
and other countries; their means of expenditure is proportionally al-
tered, and consequently their demand for each other’s goods. There is
thus, in the circumstances attending a transmission of gold from this
country, a provision made for its return, quite independently of the state
of prices, or of the circulation; and this, I conceive, is the explanation of
the phenomenon noticed by Mr. Tooke, and to which I have already
referred, that during the war, notwithstanding, a progressive increase in20/John E. Cairnes
paper money, the exchanges under every pause from the pressure of
foreign payments, tended to a recovery.
In attempting to prove, however, that the exchanges may adjust them-
selves otherwise than through the machinery of prices, and actually have
so adjusted themselves, I by no means mean to deny that a low range of
prices, co-operating with the other causes I have adverted to, may not
hasten very much the desired re-adjustment, and therefore that some
contraction of the currency on the occurrence of a drain for gold may
not be a useful means of checking the drain and turning the exchanges in
our favour, and therefore a proper measure to be adopted. But what I do
deny is, that a contraction of the circulation— though a useful resource
in connexion with other causes—is by any means the sole or even an
essential condition for effecting that object, much less such a contrac-
tion of the circulation as the act of 1844 enjoins—a contraction to the
extent of the amount of gold that is sent abroad. On the contrary, I
conceive that so sudden and violent a contraction, while it certainly will
have the effect of lowering prices, will also produce other effects, which
in their tendency are calculated to defeat the object the act has in view.
For, consider the full consequences of a sudden and extensive fall in
prices. A fall in prices would undoubtedly, as has been admitted, be in
the first place an inducement to the merchant to hasten the export of his
goods on hand—so far, it may be admitted that a contraction of the
circulation has the effect of encouraging exportation; but, on the other
hand, it would also be a motive to him for ahstaining from giving his
usual orders to the manufacturer. The manufacturer, therefore, if he
continued his productive operations, would be obliged to hold a larger
stock on hand, which would require him to become a larger borrower
than usual. But, in such a state of the money market as we are suppos-
ing,—as the Bank Charter Act would produce,—he could only extend
his loans by paying such a rate of interest as would nearly absorb all his
profits. It is further to be considered, that wages under the circumstances
would not fall in the same proportion as the prices of commodities would
fall; for it is well known that in fluctuations of prices wages are always
the last either to rise or fall. The effect, therefore, of all these circum-
stances—a falling off in orders, a very high rate of interest, wages com-
paratively (in relation to the price of commodities) high, would inevita-
bly act as a great discouragement to the fabrication of manufactures.
The consequences to be expected in a greater or less degree would be
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prostration of productive industry. Now, not to mention the injury which
this state of things would inflict upon the labouring classes, it does seem
to be a somewhat paradoxical doctrine to say, that exportation is to be
most effectually promoted by a measure which has the effect of discour-
aging or putting a stop to home production; that we shall best secure the
return of gold into the country, by retarding or preventing the fabrica-
tion of those manufactures which constitute our only means of purchas-
ing it.
But the mischievous effects of such a policy would not stop here. In
addition to the check given to productive industry, this sudden contrac-
tion of the currency would have the further effect of producing a very
general disorganization in commercial affairs. Notwithstanding the de-
ficiency in the means of effecting payments, there may be, in the cir-
cumstances we are supposing, no corresponding want of bona fide capi-
tal in the country. While the premises of the shopkeeper or factor are
empty, the warehouse of the manufacturer may be proportionately full;
what is wanting is, such an amount of circulating medium as shall fur-
nish the means of transferring the goods from one to the other. “There
cease, at such times,” says Mr. Thornton, in his work on Paper Credit,16
“to be that regularity and exactness in proportioning and adapting the
supply to the consumption, and that despatch in bringing every article
from the hands of the fabricator into actual use, which are some of the
great means of rendering industry productive, and of adding to the gen-
eral substance of a country. Every great and sudden check given to pa-
per credit, not only operates as a check to industry, but leads also to
much misapplication of it. Some diminution of the general property of
the country must follow from this cause; and, of course, a deduction
also from that part of it which forms the stock for exportation. It cannot
be necessary to repeat,” he adds, “that on the quantity of exported stock
depends the quantity of gold imported from foreign countries.” “It seems
sufficiently clear,” says the same writer, in another place,17 “that any
very sudden and violent reduction of bank notes must tend, by the con-
vulsion to which it would lead, to prevent gold from coming into the
country rather than to invite it, and thus to increase the danger to the
Bank itself.... It is indeed in every respect plain, that it must be impor-
tant to maintain carefully the credit of the country at that time in par-
ticular, when its guineas are few and also leaving it;—that is the time
when our funds are necessarily low, when the most regular industry
should by every means be promoted, and when there is most need of the22/John E. Cairnes
aid both of our domestic and foreign credit; and it belongs to the Bank
of England in particular, to guard and to superintend the interests of the
country in this respect.”
On the whole, then, I can find no grounds, either in the principles of
political economy, or in the especial circumstances attending commer-
cial derangements, for supposing that the restrictions imposed by the
act of 1844 are at all necessary towards securing the convertibility of
our paper circulation; though I think I can see how they are in many
respects calculated to defeat that end. And it is hard to see on what other
ground the principle of the act can be defended. In the rule which it lays
down for the regulation of the paper issue, the only thing it takes notice
of is the numerical amount of the circulation; but the numerical amount
of the circulation is, as regards the commercial facilities afforded to the
public, a criterion altogether fallacious. This is distinctly laid down in
the Report of the Bullion Committee of 1810. “The mere numerical
return,” says that Report, “of the amount of bank notes in circulation,
cannot be considered as at all deciding the question whether such paper
is or is not excessive.... The effective currency of the country defends on
the quickness of circulation and the number of exchanges performed in
a given time, as well as upon its numerical amount; and all the circum-
stances which have a tendency to quicken or retard the rate of circula-
tion, render the same amount of circulation more or less adequate to the
wants of trade. “It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that the same
amounts of currency are at all times equivalents. For example, in the
autumn of 1847, £20,800,000 of notes were quite insufficient to carry
on the commerce of the country; in the following spring, £18,000,000
were more than enough; and this was not because the business to be
done on the former occasion was greater than on the latter; but because,
during the panic which prevailed in the autumn of 1847, a large portion
of the circulation was paralyzed; the numerical amount of bank notes,
therefore, had ceased to be a measure of the effective currency.
Again, the act makes no provision for those disrurbing incidents
already adverted to, which tend to increase our liabilities to foreign coun-
tries, and require for their discharge an export of gold In such cases the
currency is regulated not with reference to the functions which it has to
perform, but with reference to a transaction quite independent of this—
the transmission of gold to foreign countries. The effect of this arrange-
ment is to cause a contraction in the circulation altogether disproportioned
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try, and therefore in the legitimate exchanges arising out of them. En-
gagements which were contracted when the currency stood at its ordi-
nary level come to be performed after it has been violently reduced. The
consequence is a difficulty, amounting, perhaps, to an impossibility, of
obtaining the means of discharging stipulated payments,—leading prob-
ably to a general convulsion. “There is at least one object,” says Mr.
Fullarton,18 “which would be effectually accomplished by acting on
this system. It would be perfectly calculated, I think, to ensure that no
derangement of the exchange, or none at least subsisting in coincidence
with anything like pressure on the money market, should ever be permit-
ted to pass off without one of those crises, hitherto fortunately of rare
occurrence, but of which the results, when they have occurred, have
been so extensive and so deplorable.”
Nor, in providing for the convertibility of the note, does the act take
any notice of the circumstances under which a drain for gold may take
place. These are various. A drain for gold may proceed from external or
internal causes, for the purpose of exportation, or for the purpose of
hoarding. There were examples of both kinds in the year 1847; the drain
in April took place under adverse exchanges, and the gold was sent
abroad; the drain in October took place while the exchanges were
favourable, and in this case the gold was hoarded; in fact, the drain in
the latter instance acted as much upon Bank of England notes as upon
gold.
But the Bank Act makes no distinction between all the various cases
of monetary pressure which may occur, proceeding from causes so dif-
ferent and sometimes opposite, and requiring remedies proportionately
varied: it looks to the numerical amount of notes, and to that alone. The
requirements of commerce may increase or diminish; the circulation
may be sluggish or active; confidence or panic may be prevalent; the
exchanges may be favourable or adverse; it does not signify; the act
makes no invidious distinctions; it still prescribes its £14,000,000 of
notes on securities, and beyond that has no other remedy but what has
been called “the cast-iron principle of notes for gold and gold for notes.”
Well, this “cast-iron principle,” from which its authors expected so
much, was brought to the test of experiment. The years 1846–47, charged
with such formidable events, arrived. A concurrence of misfortunes con-
spired to cause a heavy drain of gold to foreign countries; as fast as the
treasure was sent abroad, the screw was tightened upon the currency at
home; the result was, that our monetary system underwent a series of24/John E. Cairnes
shocks and dislocations, such as it had never before experienced, and
from which it was at length only rescued by an abandonment of the
principle of the act, through a direct violation of the law. “If the law,”
says Mr. Samuel Gurney, (a stout supporter of the act when it was
passed), “if the law had failed only in one case, I should have been
jealous of alteration; but we have had three periods of crisis and great
difficulty in our monetary system in the last twenty-five months, in each
of which certain that the calamity and difficulty were materially aggra-
vated by this act. If there had been only one case, I should have wished
to try it a little longer; but when we have had three successive cases, one
after another, and in each case the difficulty has been materially aggra-
vated by it, I come to the solid conclusion that the act must be relaxed.”19
“I think,” says Mr. Tooke, “that the whole of the shock to commercial
credit in the latter part of September and the first twenty-three days of
October, was mainly attributable to the operation of the act.”20 “The
Bank itself,” says Mr. Horseley Palmer, “was placed in danger, and the
commercial credit of the whole country nearly paralyzed; both which
would have been obviated, had the power of extension beyond
£14,000,000 then existed on the part of the Bank.”21
A brief sketch of some of the most remarkable features in the his-
tory of that memorable period will at once demonstrate the justice of the
opinions I have quoted, afford an illustration of the working of the act
under the influence of disturbing causes, and will enable me at the same
time to substantiate and exemplify some of the objections which I have
already advanced against it.
The causes which led to the disasters of that time are well known.
There was the potato failure, requiring immense importations of food;
there was the cotton failure, entailing a very high price for the raw ma-
terial of a staple manufacture; there was some over-speculation in trans-
actions connected with the East; and, to crown all, there was the railway
mania, rapidly converting floating capital into fixed, and rendering, it,
for all the purposes of foreign exchange, as unavailable as if it had been
sunk in the British Channel. In addition to the ordinary exports,
£9,000,000 in gold was sent abroad in discharge of our foreign engage-
ments; entailing, of course, under the bill of 1844, a proportionate re-
duction in the amount of bank notes issued The effect of this concur-
rence of disturbing causes, all coming into operation under “the cast-
iron system” of 1844, was such as those who took part in it will not
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period, there is scarcely a day in which one—often half-a-dozen—fail-
ures of houses of long standing and high character are not announced.
In London alone, during the autumn of that year, thirty-three great com-
mercial houses broke down, the aggregate amount for which they failed
being upwards of eight millions sterling: then followed in rapid succes-
sion the failures of the Royal Bank of Liverpool, the Liverpool Banking
Company, the North and South Wales Banking Company, several pri-
vate country banks, and the Union Bank of Newcastle, followed by a
heavy run on many others. “I have been thirty years in business,” says
Mr. Hodgson, director of the Liverpool Bank, “and I never witnessed
the feeling of helplessness and hopelessness so strong as in the last year;
there were heavier losses in 1825, but I never saw a greater feeling of
discouragement; persons not knowing what they could depend upon in
looking to distant operations.”22 “The distress and pressure,” says Mr.
Horseley Palmer, “ were greater than ever I remember.”23 “People
thought,” says another witness, “that they were in an iron cage and
could not get out of it, and that cage was the Act of 1844.”24
But the most striking circumstance connected with the crisis of 1847
was not the extent of the calamity —that, perhaps, was equalled on
other occasions; the characteristic feature of that crisis was the absolute
impossibility of obtaining, on any terms, for the performance of the
most essential contracts, the currency which the law of the country rec-
ognized as legal tender. It was not that accommodation could not be
obtained for speculative projects,—speculation had at this time long
ceased, and prices had long fallen; it was not that doubtful men, who
had no good security to offer, were left to their fate; the peculiarity of
the case was, that no security however unquestionable, no wealth how-
ever substantial, was of any avail for obtaining the currency essential
for the discharge of the most inevitable engagements.
In the month of October a bill, bearing the best English names,
Messrs. Hormsby, and endorsed by the Bank of France, having only
three days to run, was refused discount at the branch Bank of England
in Liverpool.25 On another occasion, the possessors of £60,000 of silver
were unable to obtain the least advance upon it; the bank being restrained
from issuing on silver beyond the extent of one-fifth of their bullion;
“they came to the bank to sell, and the bank refused to buy.”26 “The cry
has been,” says a newspaper-writer of that time,27 “not so much the rate
of interest, but the power to obtain money at all.” “At that time,” says
Mr. Gurney “we had a circulating medium of £20,800,000, and yet26/John E. Cairnes
there was great difficulty in knowing where to get £1000.”28 A curious
proof of the same fact—the dearth of legal currency at the time—is
afforded by the following statement which I have extracted from the
Times of October 22nd, 1847; it is from the letter of a special corre-
spondent sent to Liverpool to report on the state of commercial affairs.
“In regard especially to banking affairs,” the writer observes, “we may
notice a feature tending to the relief of the money market, namely, that,
contrary to the letter of their contracts with the Bank of England, those
banks in England which have accounts with the metropolitan establish-
ment are now, and have been for some days, permitted to pay out bills of
exchange as cash.” It thus happened that that accommodation which the
act of 1844 had prohibited, the extreme urgency of the case had driven
parties to supply for themselves by a kind of evasion of the law; and
bills of exchange were fast beginning to perform the functions of bank
notes.29 Another indication of the same peculiar feature in this crisis—
a dearth of currency altogether disproportioned to the scarcity of real
wealth—is to be found in the fact, that a considerable number of the
houses which stopped payment were thoroughly solvent houses; houses
which afterwards paid 20s. in the pound, and which could, if necessary,
as was stated by one of the witnesses before the House of Commons’
Committee, have as easily paid 40s. or 60s. in the pound.
Now, making all allowance for the operation of those circumstances
already indicated, in which the difficulties of that time originated—the
immense importations of food, the high price of raw cotton, the numer-
ous railway and other bubble schemes— making all due allowance for
the destruction and abstraction of capital and the disorganization of
trade which such agencies were calculated to effect; there is yet, I main-
tain, in the facts which have been adduced what none of these circum-
stances, nor all of them combined, can adequately account for. All the
damage that such agencies can be fairly charged with must be such as
can be resolved into a loss of bona fide property of one kind or other;
but they fail entirely to explain why a man with £60,000 of silver could
obtain no advance upon it in legal currency; they do not explain why
firms were obliged to stop payment, whose assets a month afterwards
more than doubled their liabilities; they fail wholly to explain the substi-
tution of bills for bank-notes, contrary to the terms of contracts. These
and other analogous phenomena are such as can only be accounted for
by reference to the state of our currency laws. But neither, it is to be
remarked, will the solution of the problem be found in the small numeri-An Examination into the Principles of Currency/27
cal amount of banknotes in the hands of the public The numerical amount
of the circulation was, at the time of greatest pressure, but little if at all
below the average (a proof, by the way, how fallacious a criterion this
affords as to our monetary condition) The evil lay not in the gross amount
of the currency being inadequate, but in its effective amount being inad-
equate. It is estimated by Mr. Gurney, that of the £21,000,000 of Bank
of England notes in the hands of the public, between £4,000,000 and
£5,000,000 were lying inactive in the hands of private bankers, for all
the purposes of currency quite inoperative. There was capital in the
country; there was currency in the country; but neither could be got to
perform its functions; the system was paralyzed by universal distrust.
Now this distrust can, I conceive, be shown distinctly and solely to be
traceable to the restrictive provisions of the Act of 1844.
To appreciate the operation of the Act in producing the effects at-
tributed to it, it is necessary to advert to the state of the reserve in the
banking department of the Bank of England, during the period of ex-
treme pressure in October, 1847. This reserve is the sole fund at the
disposal of the bank for the public accommodation. In healthy times, it
fluctuates between about £7,000,000 and £10,000,000. Under the in-
fluence of the several exhausting causes pressing during that year on the
resources of the bank—aided also by injudicious conductor the part of
the bank directors—the reserve had been brought down to about
£2,000,000; the portion of it in the central establishment in London did
not much exceed £1,500,000. This fund, far from being sufficient to
afford anything like the ordinary accommodation to the public, was
scarcely adequate to meet the demands of depositors; and there was no
means of recruiting it. The only two possible means by which it could
have been recruited were by a sale of securities, or by an increased issue
of notes; but the former resource the state of the money market rendered
impracticable,30 the latter the act of 1844 interdicted. The bank, there-
fore, had come to the end of its resources, and, so long as the restrictive
law continued, was incapable of giving accommodation upon any terms.
Here, then, was the efficient cause of the panic and of the evils which
resulted from it. Country bankers, before making their usual advances
to their customers, naturally took the precaution of ascertaining if they
could count upon their ordinary accommodation from the Bank of En-
gland; but the Bank of England was tied in the meshes of the Charter
Act, and could promise no discounts upon any terms; the securities of-
fered might be unquestionable, there might be no objection to the rate of28/John E. Cairnes
interest, but the funds of the bank had run dry and could not be re-
cruited. The country banks, therefore having no prospect of their ordi-
nary accommodation, naturally increased their reserves of notes, and
refused to their customers the usual advances. The feeling was thus
propagated from banks to companies, from companies to individuals.
Every one who had engagements to meet was thrown on the defensive;
he clutched closely whatever of the coin of the realm happened to come
into his hands, and awaited the result. Nor was the panic an unreason-
able or unreasoning one. True, the currency in the hands of the public
was sufficient for their purposes if people had only trusted each other;
but this, though proved by the event, no one knew at the time. All that
was known was, that no man could reckon on the means of obtaining his
usual accommodation upon any terms; and, under these circumstances,
to have failed to provide adequately against contingencies which could
not be calculated upon, instead of being a proof of philosophic sagacity,
would have been nothing else than foolhardy recklessness.
While things stood thus, the letter of the Government suspending
the Act appeared, and the panic was instantaneously allayed. The rock
had been struck, and forthwith the currency gushed out from the hoards
where it had been accumulating, and in the course of a week became so
abundant, that the difficulty was no longer how to get money, but how
to dispose of it.31 And why was, this? Was it, as some have contended
that the Government letter, destitute of any real efficacy, acted with a
kind of talismanic influence on the imaginations of the people—with a
sort of ‘Open, Sesame!’ power the tills of bankers? Nothing of the kind.
That letter, announcing the suspension of the Act, was merely an obvi-
ous remedy working its natural and inevitable effect, the effect which all
whose eyes were not blinded by their theories foresaw, and predicted it
would produce. It enabled the Bank of England to say to their custom-
ers, what the Act of 1844 had prevented them from saying, viz.:—“We
can undertake to promise you accommodation at 8 per cent if you re-
quire it.” The moment this accommodation could be calculated upon,
the necessity for hoarding had ceased. The country banks freely distrib-
uted their large reserves; the circulation flowed down into its natural
channels; and, though not a note was issued by the Bank beyond the
limit set by the Act, the mere consciousness on the part of the public
that, if necessary, notes might be issued, the knowledge that a discre-
tionary power had taken the place of an inflexible rule, was sufficient to
restore confidence, and to render the circulation adequate to all the wantsAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/29
of the community.
But the full extent of the danger in which this restrictive law in-
volved the country has yet to be stated. The Bank itself was placed in
imminent jeopardy. While its reserve in London had been reduced to
£1,500,000, the deposits of the London bankers alone considerably ex-
ceeded that sum.32 These deposits might have been called for at any
moment; any accident might have led to a demand for them. Now, had
these deposits been called for, the Bank of England must have stopped
payment; and had this occurred, its notes would have ceased to be legal
tender. The effect would have been, that all that portion of the reserve of
country banks which consisted of Bank of England notes would, as re-
serve, have come useless; they could no longer have been given in pay-
ment of country bank notes. Under these circumstances, there would
have been great reason to fear that the whole of the Bank of England
notes held at this time by the country bankers, and which amounted to
about six millions,33 have been returned on the central establishment.
Had this taken place, it would nearly have exhausted the treasure in the
issue department, which was at this time under £8,000,000; and the
remaining £2,000,000 would almost certainly have been carried off in
the general confusion and dismay which such a run would have inevita-
bly occasioned. In short, it is the opinion of several witnesses of great
practical experience, examined before the committees of 1848, an opin-
ion confirmed by the Report of the House of Lords’ Committee, that
nothing but the tardy interposition of the Government saved the con-
vertibility of the note, which the stringency of the Act had endangered.34
But while the Bank Charter Act was thus producing a pressure and
panic of its own, altogether independent of the circumstances which had
originated these disastrous occurrences, was there any justification to
be found for this otherwise gratuitous mischief, in the dangers which
were then threatening the Bank? Was gold leaving the country in such
quantities as to cause alarm? Was the bullion of the Bank so reduced as
to justify this resort to extreme measures of restriction? On the contrary,
the exchanges had been for three months in our favour; upwards of
£2,000,000 of gold had come into the country between August and Oc-
tober; and there were still £8,000,000 in the coffers of the Bank. But the
gold which was coming into the country, instead of going, as in times of
confidence it would, to the Bank of England, scared away from the iron
cage which the Charter Act had provided for it, found its way to the tills
of private traders, and, as circulation, became inoperative.30/John E. Cairnes
Or could it be said that the excessive severity of the pressure which
the Act was occasioning, was tending ultimately to right the system, by
its action upon our exports and imports; and that thus compensation for
the immediate mischief would be afforded, by the future adjustment
which it tended to bring about? Was the pressure, in a word, stimulating
our exports and checking our imports, in conformity with the views of
those who represent a contraction of the currency as the one and only
means of adjusting the exchanges? On the contrary, it was tending to
exactly the opposite result, and thus affording a direct negative to those
views Its operation in this respect may be gathered from the address of
the deputation of Liverpool merchants, who waited upon Government
on the 18th Oct., 1847. This deputation was composed of Mr. W. Brown,
M.P., Mr. Cardwell, M.P., Mr. Wilson, Patten, M.P., the Mayor of
Liverpool, Mr. Horsfall, and others. “At present,” the address observes,
“produce of every kind could only be disposed of at an enormous sacri-
fice. Orders from abroad for goods or produce could not be executed,
from the impossibility of converting into cash the bills drawn against
them.” The memorial then proceeds to advert to the necessity of a tem-
porary advance by Government. “It would effect,” they say, “an im-
mense benefit for the mercantile classes, and, by tending to allay ground-
less alarms, cause the release of large sums of money, which are now
locked up and comparatively profitless, in consequence of the panic
which prevailed. The accounts daily received from the manufacturing
districts inform us, that houses of the greatest respectability and most
ample resources had bent before the overwhelming pressure of the present
moment; and those who were most experienced in monetary affairs agreed
in saying, that if Government did not immediately come to the relief of
bankers, merchants, and traders, on whose prosperity so much of the
wealth of the country depended, the result would be that houses now
solvent, and possessing ample means (if their securities were convert-
ible into ready money) would be involved in the common ruin.” Thus
this excessive tightening of the money market, to which its authors looked
as the sole means of stimulating exportation, and thus aiding the adjust-
ment of the exchanges, was tending directly towards the opposite result.
It was fast deranging all the operations of industry, and sapping those
resources of returning wealth on which the country ultimately must rely
for restoring its balance of trade, and thereby securing, the metallic
basis of its currency.
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of first-rate authority, before the committees of 1848. Mr. Hodgson,35
in his examination before the House of Commons’ Committee, is asked,
“Can you give any opinion as to the effect upon the export trade of the
great difficulty which existed in discounting?—For a time it almost sus-
pended the export trade.” “By the impossibility of getting discount?—
Yes, it has almost suspended the export trade, and in that way retarded
the adjustment of the exchanges.” Before the same committee Mr. Samuel
Gurney36 is asked, “Did it come under your notice that the difficulty of
obtaining discounts in April and October had any effect upon the export
trade?—A very decided effect in checking the export trade.” Again he is
asked, “In the imports of corn, when the profits may be 50 or 60 or 100
per cent, do you think that the raising the rate of interest would check a
speculation of that kind?—It would not.” So that while the action of the
Bank was powerless in restraining importation in times of speculative
excitement it had a very decided effect in checking exportation under
monetary pressure. It is in this way that the Bank Charter Act operates
in adjusting an adverse balance of trade.
It thus appears that this Act, as it fails to satisfy the conditions of a
correct theory of currency, deduced from the nature of a circulating,
medium and the functions which it has to perform; so also, when brought
to the test of a commercial crisis—the test which may be considered as
the experimentum crucis of a monetary system—it has proved a signal
and complete failure.
During the memorable period which we have been considering, what
one of the requisites of a good system can this law be said to have
fulfilled? What one of the objects for which it was enacted can it be said
to have accomplished? Did it place a restraint upon speculation in the
earlier stages of confidence and excitement? On the contrary, the public
received from the Bank of England under the present charter an extent
of banking facilities quite unprecedented. Did this law, when distrust
had succeeded to confidence, enable the Bank to atone for the mischief
it had stimulated, by coming forward with a judicious liberality to re-
lieve the excessive pressure? On the contrary, its restrictive provisions
just became really operative when a full discretion was required, and
thus the inevitable evils of the times were aggravated by a panic, the
fruits solely of its Procrustean enactments.37 It did not save from a sus-
pension of payments the most solvent and prudent houses—houses of
which the assets were more than double the liabilities. It did not pre-
serve the money market from fluctuations in the rate of interest greater32/John E. Cairnes
than till then had ever been heard of. It did not secure the Bank of En-
gland from the imminent danger of suspension. Even the convertibility
of our paper circulation was, under the guardianship of this principle,
placed in the utmost jeopardy, and only saved by discarding it. The law
has proved itself wholly unfit to meet the strain of disturbing forces; and
this being so, it would seem important, now when we are entering upon
a period more than usually liable to monetary derangements and diffi-
culties of various kinds, that public attention should be drawn towards
this subject, in order that our currency code, with which so much of the
commercial prosperity of the country is bound up, and on which its
ability to support the exhaustion of, it may be, a protracted war is so
largely dependent, may have the benefits of such modifications and im-
provements, as those whose experience and opportunities entitle them to
advise in such matters may suggest.
Without pretending to propound any definite scheme for the regula-
tion of the currency, which must be left to those practically versed in
banking affairs, I would venture to call attention to some general prin-
ciples which apply to this subject, and which, in the copious discussions
the question has at various times undergone, have already, with more or
less cogency, been elicited.
There is a school of economists who oppose the principles of the
Act of 1844 on grounds wholly distinct from those which have been
advanced in the foregoing pages. I allude to those persons who advocate
what is called “free-trade in banking.” Such persons conceive that any
interference on the part of the state in the transactions of private indi-
viduals, in which they may be supposed to be themselves the best judges
of their own interests, is a proceeding at variance with the broad prin-
ciples of free-trade; and they hold, with respect to the issue of bank
notes, as with respect to the production of all other commodities, that
the best security for the public is to be found in the mutual competition
of producers. If, it may be said, A can induce B to take his promises to
pay on demand, in discount of a bill; if B can induce C to receive those
same promises to pay, in satisfaction of a debt; and if the notes issued
by A thus get into circulation, why, it may be asked, should the state
interfere? Each of these parties may be supposed to know his own inter-
est better than the state can know it; no one need receive the notes if he
does not please; they are not legal tender; and if these parties all find it
their convenience to carry on their dealings in this way, why should they
be hampered by restrictions, founded upon the exploded fallacy that theAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/33
state understands the interests of its members better than the individual
members themselves?
This, I believe, is the view of those who advocate free-trade in bank-
ing; and it is, at least, sufficient to throw the onus of proof upon their
opponents—to require those who would subject the issue of bank notes
to legal restrictions, to make out, with respect to the currency, clear
grounds for exceptional treatment—to show that the principles of free-
trade and unrestricted competition are here inapplicable. Now, without
pretending to enter fully into this question, it will be enough for my
purpose to show that the currency does constitute an exceptional case;
and that the reasons which, in the production of commodities generally,
render free competition the best security for the public interest, do not
obtain in the case of the issue of paper money.
Currency differs from all other commodities in this, that it is not
only a commodity but a measure of value, and on this ground it is that
coining is properly considered a prerogative of state. The privilege of
coining has always been invested with a number of sanctions; and the
same reasons which apply to coining apply in a still stronger degree to
the issue of paper money. A paper currency only answers its purpose so
far as it takes the place of coin, and performs all that coin would per-
form. Inasmuch, therefore, as paper money thus becomes a measure of
value, it belongs to the state to regulate it. But there is a further reason
for state control in the case of paper money, that does not exist in the
case of coin. Upon coin issued in the intrinsic metal there is no profit to
be made; when paper money is issued, as the paper is intrinsically worth-
less, there is a profit to the extent of the issue. Now, there is no reason
why any individual should be permitted to monopolize this profit; it is
the property of the public, and should go to the state. This principle is
recognized in those provisions of the Act of 1844 which require the
Bank to pay, in services or otherwise, for its privilege of issuing
£14,000,000 of notes without a metallic basis. The stamp duty upon
bank notes is also of the same nature.
The principles of free-trade applied to the issue of notes would be
inconsistent with the functions which notes are intended to perform. A
bank note is not simply a piece of paper issued on the credit of the
person who issues it, and who is obliged to pay it in the legal coin of the
realm; it is a substitute for coin, and is intended for the purpose of
currency, which, by the very definition of the term, means that it should
pass from hand to hand without question. But this purpose would be34/John E. Cairnes
defeated if any man were permitted, without guarantee of any kind, to
issue his notes payable on demand to any person who would take them.
The exigencies of traders would at times give them no choice but to take
such notes, which, thus getting surreptitiously into the genuinely sound
paper currency, would discredit the whole of it, and render it unfit to
perform the offices of currency.
Lastly, the principle of unrestricted competition is inapplicable to
the regulation of the currency. The advantages of competition in all
ordinary cases depend upon these circumstances,—that the public are
interested in obtaining the greatest quantity of the article produced at
the cheapest price; that the loss from over-production falls exclusively
on the producer; and that it is the interest of the producer to conform to
the proper rule by which the supply should be adjusted to the demand.
Now, with regard to paper money, the object which competition secures
is not that in securing which the public is most concerned. What the
public requires is not the greatest quantity of currency at the cheapest
price, but just such a quantity as shall circulate the commodities to be
exchanged in the country, at a value corresponding to a given standard.
Again, when over-production occurs in the case of paper money, the
loss does not fall exclusively or principally on the producer, but chiefly
on the public who hold his notes. Nor is it the interest of the issuer of
notes to regulate his issue so as to keep their value exactly up to the
standard; on the contrary, it is the interest of each separate issuer to
violate this rule. The issue of notes, therefore, should not properly be
considered as a trade at all, but as a state prerogative, for which, if
delegated to any body, the public should require an equivalent; and the
nature of the currency, and the functions which has to perform, clearly
take it out of the class of cases to which the principles of free-trade and
the advantages of unrestricted competition apply.
The principle of competition being thus shown to be unsuited to the
regulation of the issue of paper money, there would seem to be no ad-
vantage obtained in permitting a plurality of issuers; and, indeed, on
theoretical grounds, a single source of issue appears to be altogether the
most desirable arrangement. I am unable, however, to see in this cir-
cumstance the extreme importance that Mr. McCulloch and others are
disposed to attribute to it; nor do I suppose that the public advantages
which would arise from restricting the privilege of issuing notes to a
single source, would be at all an equivalent for the hardships which
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spect, the course taken by the Bank Charter Act, restricting the privi-
lege of issuing to such banks of issue as were established at the time the
act passed, and offering an inducement to the abandonment of the privi-
lege, was, perhaps, on the whole, a fair and judicious one.
The next point to be noticed is one which appears to me to be of
fundamental importance, namely, that in the last resort the issue of notes,
whether committed to one or more issuers, should be entrusted to the
discretion of some man or body of men. No system of rules however
ingeniously contrived can, so far as I can see, supersede the necessity of
this. In the course of the foregoing observations, several arguments have
been advanced in support of this position, showing that a fixed inflex-
ible rule, laid down without reference to what may be the state of trade
and of public feeling in particular conjunctures, is quite incompatible
with the preservation of that uniformity of value in the circulating me-
dium, which is one of the first requisites of a good system. I shall sub-
join in the note the opinions of some of the highest practical and scien-
tific authorities upon this point, given in their evidence before the par-
liamentary committees.38
It is true there will always be a certain amount of risk and danger in
any system which is confided to the discretion of fallible men. The leav-
ing anything to discretion implies a corresponding degree of imperfec-
tion in the machine; is doubtless something in the notion of a self-acting
system that conduces to the serenity and self-glorification, perhaps, of
its framers. But those who are carried away by this idea should remem-
ber that, under the Act of 1844, while the hands of the bank are tied in
times of pressure from giving effectual relief, the system is yet as much
as ever liable to all the perils that are inseparable from discretionary
power; it has, in fact, all the evils which belong to a system resting on
discretionary power without its advantages. The great mischief to be
apprehended on this score is improvident liberality on the part of the
Bank at one time, obliging it at another, in self-defence, to resort to
sudden action.39 Now there is as much room for mismanagement in this
respect under the present law, in dealing, with the banking department,
as under the former system, when the two departments were united and
the regulation of the issue was left to the judgment of the directors. In
each case, what they have to exercise their judgment upon is the treat-
ment of their reserve: in one case this reserve is the amount of notes held
by the banking department; in the other, it is the amount of treasure in
the cellars of the Bank. When the directors become aware of the diffi-36/John E. Cairnes
culties of their position, they have, in the latter case, a large margin to
deal with, and their hands are free to act according to their sense of what
the emergency requires. In the former, the margin is liable to be so re-
duced as naturally to excite alarm, while the knowledge on the part of
the public that the Bank is bound within inflexible rules tends, as it
happened in 1847, to convert the alarm into panic. Their action may in
such cases be expected to be more sudden; its effects on the money
market more violent; and consequently the dangers to be apprehended
from a discretion, thus acting within narrow limits, more formidable
than if it were entirely unshackled.
Again, if it should be thought that in thus advocating the necessity
of a discretionary power for the regulation of the issue, (subject of course
to the obligation of paying in gold upon we are claiming for a paper
currency that which could have no place if the currency were metallic—
since there would be no such means of multiplying sovereigns at plea-
sure; it should be remembered that the analogy between a metallic and
paper currency can under no circumstances be complete. There must
always be this broad distinction between them, that the medium which
in the one case possesses intrinsic value, is, in the other case, intrinsi-
cally worthless. Every one who possesses a coin knows exactly what he
can calculate upon, and this quite independently of mint regulations; but
under a paper currency, the value of the note being wholly conventional,
to satisfy the holder of the note of its value there is need of public con-
fidence. Now the maintenance of this public confidence, which in legis-
lating for a paper currency is an element of primary importance, need
not be considered at all in the regulation of a metallic currency.  The
coin possesses a natural value, and therefore may be left to find its own
level; the note possesses no such value, and therefore must be supported
by additional contrivances. Here, then, is the ground upon which a dis-
cretion which has no place in the one system, is absolutely indispens-
able in the other; for the confidence of the public in the stability of a
system resting upon convention—such as the currency—is contingent
upon such a variety of circumstances, may he affected by such acci-
dents, rumours, and mere trifles, that nothing short of a discretion guided
by full and detailed knowledge can adequately satisfy the exigencies of
the case.
The further question, of course, arises as to the hands in which this
discretion should be placed.40 This is admittedly a point of great diffi-
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Lords’ Committee in the year 1848, in which the several plans proposed
by witnesses are very fully examined and canvassed. One proposal,
however, is decidedly negatived, viz., that of maintaining the Act, with
an understanding that it should be suspended as occasion required.  Upon
this the report observes, “To leave these cases, when they do arise, to be
dealt with by the irregular exercise of the mere authority of the Crown
and its advisers—setting aside ‘once in five or six years,’ or even at
periods more remote, the express provisions of a distinct statute—ap-
pears wholly inconsistent with that fixity and order which it is or ought
to be the object of all law to secure.”
The last point to be noticed is the principle upon which the reserve
of treasure, held by the Bank, should be managed. The object of main-
taining a reserve of bullion is, of course, to secure the convertibility of
bank notes, and to do so with as little violence as possible to the regular
transactions of commerce. The convertibility of the note is endangered
through the vicissitudes of trade, and more particularly foreign trade. If,
however, the security of the note were the only thing to be considered, a
comparatively small amount of treasure would be sufficient. Mr. Ricardo
was of opinion that you might maintain a circulation of paper by bullion
payments, in the proportion of £25,000,000 of paper to £3,000,000 of
bullion. Supposing such a case to be possible in theory, it could obvi-
ously be only carried out in practice by a recourse to such extreme
measures on the part of the Bank, on the occurrence of the least irregu-
larity in the exchanges, as on every such occasion to throw the commer-
cial world into violent convulsions. It would be necessary to resort to a
sudden contraction of the circulation; the Bank either refusing all ac-
commodation to the public, or throwing its securities in large quantities
on the market; and it is doubtless conceivable that the sudden enhance-
ment which such measures would cause in the value of the circulating
median, might be effectual in saving the convertibility of the note; though
it would be at the expense (as happened in 1847, when measures of this
kind were adopted) of great hardship and suffering to the commercial
public. Now, the advantage of keeping a large amount of treasure in
reserve is, that we may, by availing ourselves of this treasure in times of
difficulty, secure the convertibility of our paper circulation, without being
under the necessity of resorting to expedients of this violent and mis-
chievous character. By holding such an amount of treasure in the Bank
in ordinary times, as may be sufficient to meet the accidental large pay-
ments which we may have to make to foreign countries, we have a fund38/John E. Cairnes
at hand from which we can draw in times of pressure; and by the assis-
tance of which we can tide over our seasons of difficulty with little
disturbance to the general course of trade. It is just as if a man who had
a fixed income, but was liable to be suddenly called upon to pay large
unexpected demands, should determine to lay something by to keep as a
store from which to meet emergencies. He would by this means escape
the serious inconvenience of being obliged to make the whole deduction
from the income of the year in which the extraordinary payment had to
be made. Just the same is, I conceive, the principle on which the country
should maintain its reserve of bullion; and it would seem quite as irra-
tional on the part of the community, as it would be on the part of an
individual, if, while keeping by it this large reserve of unproductive
treasure, it prescribed rules for its conduct, which prevented it from
availing itself of the reserve when the time of pressure came;—if, in
short, it kept this large reserve of treasure for the special and sole pur-
pose of never using it. Now this is the way in which the present law
operates: it obliges the Bank to diminish the amount of notes issued in
proportion as its bullion is diminished; and as the reduction in the amount
of bank notes soon reaches the point, beyond which if carried there
would not be sufficient for the business of the country, the effect is, that
the pressure on the money market may reach its maximum, and all com-
mercial movements may be paralyzed, while, all the time, there may be
a large amount of unemployed treasure locked up in the cellars of the
bank. It was in this respect that the absurdity of the Bank Charter Act
principle became so conspicuous in the year 1847. At that time, when
the Bank had come to the end of its legal resources,—when, for want of
the usual accommodation, transactions had come to a stand-still,—the
treasure in the issue department was never reduced much below
£8,000,000.
In all probability £1,000,000 of this sum would, any time in the
month of October, have relieved the pressure, and trade would have
been restored to its normal condition; but, by the restrictive provisions
of the act, this vast store of gold was rendered, when the time of need
came, absolutely inefficacious, utterly unavailable for the only purpose
for which a reserve fund can with any show of reason be maintained. It
appears to be but common sense that, if a country goes to the expense of
keeping a large surplusage of the precious metals beyond what its ordi-
nary wants require, it should at least not be precluded, when the hour of
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In this absurdity, however, the country is involved so long as the
present artificial rule of restriction is maintained. We subject ourselves
to all the expense of keeping a large unemployed treasure; and we sub-
ject ourselves also to all the public inconvenience and agitation incident
to those extreme measures, which are only necessary with a small one.
The system unites the evils of both methods: it has the advantages of
neither. What seems evidently to be the sound course, considering the
vicissitudes to which commerce is liable, is to keep a large reserve of
treasure, but to keep it on such an understanding as shall enable us to
avail ourselves of it, when the proper occasion arrives.  Instead, then, of
the Bank being obliged, when a drain for gold sets in, to convulse the
commercial world by a resort to extreme measures—throning its securi-
ties in large quantities on the market, or refusing to the public the ordi-
nary accommodation upon any terms,—any probable crisis may be met
by the mild expedient of a timely and gradual rise in the rate of inter-
est,41 trusting to the export of gold ultimately to satisfy the foreign de-
mand. This, of course, supposes that a foreign drain is not indefinite;
but I have already shown that it is not so.
A proposal for the management of the Bank treasure was submitted
by Mr. Tooke to the Secret Committee of the House of Commons on
Commercial Distress, in the year 1848; and as in that proposal the prin-
ciples of management here advocated are fully recognized, and have
thus the sanction of Mr. Tooke’s high authority, it may not be amiss to
give an outline of his recommendations. The examination in extenso
would be too long to quote. He recommends that the average amount of
bullion (struck over about five years) should be £12,000,000;—the
maximum being £18,000,000, the minimum £6,000,000. He would take
about four per cent. as the regular rate of interest; and supposing the
treasure to be at its maximum and a drain to set in, he would keep the
interest at four per cent. till the treasure was reduced to about
£12,000,000; as soon as the treasure fell below this, he would raise the
rate of interest to six per cent.; and if the drain were not then corrected,
he would permit it to run on till the bullion was reduced to £6,000,000.
When the treasure had fallen to this, the country would have parted with
£12,000,000 of gold; “and I have no idea,” he says, “that after parting
with £12,000,000 there are any circumstances in which the country could
be placed that would endanger a further continuance of the drain.” If,
however, the drain should continue further, he would then let the Bank,
by restricting its discounts or otherwise, take measures for its own secu-40/John E. Cairnes
rity; at worst, the evils would be no greater than under the resent system
may be expected to occur upon every serious derangement of the for-
eign exchanges. Having, by acting on this rate of interest and by this
large export of gold, satisfied the drain (as in all probable cases Mr.
Tooke is satisfied would be the result,) he would then recommend the
interest to be kept up to six per cent. till the reserve again reached its
maximum of £18.000,000 He does not say that this should be by a
regulation.’ “I am quite sure,” he says, “that you must leave it to the
discretion of some man or some body of men. It should be more in the
nature of an understanding, which should come into question at the re-
newal of the charter of the Bank, for which they should be responsible;
not as a matter of regulation; for it is as a matter of regulation that I
object to the present act.”
On such a plan the reserve of treasure in the bank would perform,
under our mixed currency, the same functions which, in those countries
where the currencies are metallic, are performed by the numerous petty
hoards, forming in the aggregate a very large sum, which lie inactive in
the tills and drawers of private parties; and which, in times of pressure,
under the temptation of high interest, come out to meet extraordinary
demands; thus saving the necessity of any serious encroachment upon
the circulating medium of the country. Indeed, a currency based upon
such a large reserve of treasure as Mr. Tooke has proposed, and man-
aged according to the principles which have been indicated, would alto-
gether conform much more closely to the analogy of a metallic system
(if this be deemed a matter of great importance,) than our present mon-
etary code; which, in this respect at least, fails entirely in realizing the
pretensions which have been put forward for it by its authors.
Notes
1. It is not to be understood that, in sanctioning the publication of a
work, the Society pledges itself to all the opinions contained in it.
2. M Culloch’s Smith’s Wealth of Nations, note, p. 505.
3. See Mr. Morris’s evidence before the Secret Committee (House of
Commons) on Commercial Distress, 1848. Q. 3690.
4. The separation of the issuing and banking departments of the Bank
of England has been regarded by some high authorities as leading to
practical consequences of very injurious tendency, calculated directly
to defeat the object for which the restriction upon the issue of notes
was introduced. The practical object kept in view in that restriction
was undoubtedly to impose such a check upon the proceedings of theAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/41
bank as to induce it, in times of speculative excitement, to limit more
narrowly than it had previously done its accommodation to the pub-
lic,—to restrain, in a word, as far as possible, the spirit of overtrad-
ing. Now the effect of the separation of the departments has as been,
in the opinion of the authorities referred to (Mr. Horsley Palmer, Mr.
Samuel Gurney, and others), to impress the bank directors with the
notion that they were henceforth absolved from all responsibility to
the public in their mode of management, and were bound merely to
consider the pecuniary interest of their own proprietary; and the con-
sequence of this impression on the part of the directors has been, to
induce them to deal with their reserve in such a manner as to afford,
in times when speculation was rife, every encouragement and facility
to the prevalent mania, it its certainly true that, before the passing of
the Bank Charter Act, the directors did consider that they had some-
thing more to attend to than the dividends of the proprietors; suffi-
cient proof of this is to be found in the general steadiness (precious to
the year, 1844) of the bank rate of interest, which, whatever the mar-
ket rate of interest might be, was never reduced below 4 nor raised
above 6 per cent; and it is equally certain that since the passing of the
act of 1844, the impression alluded to on the part of the Directors—
that they were free from all obligation but that of attending to the
dividends of be proprietors—did exists and in practice governed their
conduct. This, besides being established by the evidence of directors
of the bank, is placed beyond doubt by their management of the bank
concerns in the years 1846–7; when instead of confining themselves
within the limits in all previous times acted on, they entered fully into
all the competition on the money market, forcing accommodation on
the public when their reserve happened to be high, on such terms as
two per cent interest and, when their reserves ran low, coming to an
abrupt stop, and refusing accommodation upon any terms. That such
has been the operation of the Bank Charter Act is, I conceive, placed
beyond doubt, though I think it may be doubted if this effect is to be
attributed to that portion of the measure which provided for the sepa-
ration of the issuing and banking departments, which appears to have
been, on the whole, a convenient arrangement, and was practically
acted on before the passing of the Bank Charter hot. The impression
alluded to, with reference to the independence of the Bank in relation
to the public and the injurious consequences in the management of
the banking affairs to which it led, would appear to me to be more42/John E. Cairnes
properly charged upon the other portion of the measure, which takes
out of the hands of the Bank all discretion as to the control of its
issues. It was inculcated by those who recommended the measure of
1844, that the issue of paper money was not properly a function of
banking at all, and that, this being taken out of the hands of the Bank
of England, they had thenceforward nothing to consider but the inter-
est of the Bank as a pecuniary investment. The mischievous effects,
therefore, resulting from this understanding, form a fair ground of
objection, in addition to those which will be advanced in the subse-
quent part of this paper, against the principle of restriction contained
in the act. It is quite vain to say, as has been said, that the interests of
the Bank of England and those of the public, properly understood,
are identical. This may be so; but it is quite certain that the manage-
ment of an establishment conducted professedly with a view to pub-
lic interests and that of one conducted professedly with a view to the
interests of the proprietary alone, would be very different.
5. Fullarton on the Regulation of the Currencies, pp. 71–74.
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14. For example, Mr. Tooke, the author of the History of Prices, in his
examination before the Committee on Banks of Issue, 1840, is asked
by Mr. Grote, Q 3745: “Are you of opinion that a mixed circulation
of paper and coin ought to fluctuate in amount in the same manner
and proportion as a metallic currency, if we had a metallic currency,
would fluctuate?—I am not at all clear that in a mixed circulation of
coin and paper, it is desirable that the fluctuations in the amount
should vary exactly with the fluctuations in the amount of bullion; on
the contrary, I believe that a variation in the amount of the circula-An Examination into the Principles of Currency/43
tion, corresponding exactly, or as nearly as might be, with the varia-
tion in the amount of bullion, would be exceedingly inconvenient,
and occasion frequent and sometimes violent oscillations in the rate
of interest, or, as it is technically called, the money-market.
“3744. If the paper circulation is to be preserved constantly
conformable in value to gold, must it not conform in quantity con-
stantly also to gold?—Not at all; as long as the paper is strictly con-
vertible into gold, it cannot be said that the value of the currency is
impaired; there may be a very considerable occasional demand for
the export of the precious metals, without any ground of inference
that the originating cause of it has been any excess of the circulation
of this country: with a sufficient reserve of bullion on the part of the
bank, the probability is, that the gold would in such case return, and
that there may have been no intermediate disturbance of that amount
of the circulation, which was previously not in excess as compared
with the ordinary transactions of the country.
“3746. Do not you think that, however large the reserve of gold
in the hands of the bank might be at the period when the foreign drain
began, if the bank were either to increase the quantity of bank notes
in circulation, or even to decline contracting them during the course
of the drain, the probability is very much increased indeed of the
drain continuing to such an extent as to exhaust the bank reserve of
bullion, and thus to frustrate the possibility of maintaining the con-
vertibility of bank notes?—I believe that, with a large reserve of bul-
lion at the commencement of any drain, if the bank simply kept their
securities from increasing beyond the amount which, previously to
the drain, they found that they had been able to preserve, without any
obvious effect in causing an extreme depression of the rate of inter-
est, they might retain that amount of securities, and then consequently,
in all probability, there would be no material alternation of the circu-
lation the bank might allow, to some extent, the drain to proceed
without any forced operation, beyond a very moderate rise in the rate
of interest. I can conceive of hardly any circumstances which would
not enable it, always supposing a large average reserve, to main-
tain very nearly the same amount of circulation, except in as far as
it might be acted upon by the public, consistently with admitting of
a reflux of bullion.”
15. See Tooke’s History of Prices, vol. 2, p. 51. note.
16. Thornton on Paper Credit, page 85; 1802 .44/John E. Cairnes
17. Ibid. page 87.
18. Fullarton on the Regulation of Currencies, page 137.
19. Report of Secret Committee (House of Lords) on Commercial Dis-
tress, 1848, p. xxviii.
20.  Secret Committee of the House of Commons on Commercial Dis-
tress. 1848. Q. 5336.
21. Ibid. Q. 1945.
22. Secret Committee (House of Commons,) on Commercial Distress,
Q. 95.
23. Report of Lords’ Committee, page viii.
24. Ibid.
25. See Mr. Hodgson’s evidence before Committee on Commercial Dis-
tress, (House of Commons), 1848, Q. 71.
26. Speech of Mr. Thomas Baring (House of Commons), 10th May,
1847.
27. Manchester Guardian.
28. Evidence before House of Commons on Commercial Distress 1848,
Q. 1737.
29. The same fact—the partial substitution of bills of exchange for
bank notes in discharge of engagements contracted to be paid in bank
notes—is attested by Mr. Hodgson, in his evidence before the Secret
Committee (House of Commons) on Commercial Distress, 1848, Q.
194–195. It is, perhaps, worth while remarking that Mr. Thornton,
writing 46 years before this time, in his work on Paper Credit, when
discussing the effects of such a sudden action upon the circulation as
the act of 1844 afterwards prescribed, distinctly points out that the
consequence adverted to would ensue. The passage is as follows:—
“The case which has been put is, however, merely hypothetical; for
there is too strong and evident an interest in every quarter to main-
tain, in some way or other, the regular course of London payments,
to make it probable that this scene of confusion should occur; or,
even if it should arise, that it would continue. Whether there might
change to be much or little gold in the country, steps would be taken
to induce the Bank to issue its usual quantity of paper, or measures
would be resorted to for providing by some means a substitute for
it.” (Edition, 1802; page 76.) This is an accurate prediction of what
actually did happen in the year 1847.
30. See Mr. Tooke’s evidence, House of Commons’ Committee on Com-
mercial Distress, 1848. Q. 5472–5; also Mr. H. Palmer’s evidenceAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/45
before House of Lords’ Committee, 1848, p xv. Report.
31. Mr. Samuel Gurney, in his examination before the Secret Commit-
tee (House of Commons), on commercial distress, 1848, gave an ac-
count of an incident that occurred to his own firm, and which, as
putting in a striking point of view the effect of the issue of the govern-
ment letter, may be worth quoting here. He is asked (Q. 1599),
“What was the effect of the issue of the government letter?—
The effect was that of immediate relief: perhaps I cannot explain the
case better than by telling the history of my own firm on the day on
which the government letter came down, and the previous Saturday:
up to that Saturday our firm had no occasion to apply for any assis-
tance from the Bank of England; in consequence of the feeling of
panic we had on the Saturday to get possession of the circulating
medium, I went over to the governor of the Bank to negotiate an
advance; I was received by him, as I have always been in that estab-
lishment, with great courtesy, but I was told that they could not give
me an answer till two o’clock in the day, but that they would, if
practicable, make a point of letting me have the money. They gave
me a pretty strong expectation that they would, but that they should
charge me ten per cent interest.
“Have you any objection to mention the amount?—The amount
was £200,000; whether £20,000 more or less I cannot say. I stated to
the governor that it was a matter perfectly immaterial whether we
lost two, or three, or four hundred pounds in such a transaction, but
that I thought it would have a very injurious effect if it were stated in
the city that our firm had paid ten per cent. I strongly urged this, and
he was kind enough to relax to nine per cent, but below that he was
quite unwilling to go, and we paid nine per cent. That was on Satur-
day. On the Monday morning there was the same cloud over the city;
there was a strong desire, both on the part of gentlemen from the
country and bankers in London, to get possession of circulating me-
dium, as they most reasonably thought, while it was to be had; and a
very great variety of orders came in from the bankers for sums of
money, and from others not bankers. I went over to the Bank (or my
partner), and stated that we should want a similar sum; we were
received with the same courtesy, and told that at two o’clock they
would let us know whether we could have it or not; before two o’clock
this relaxing letter had come down, and very generally the orders for
money were withdrawn; they said, “we do not want the money now—46/John E. Cairnes
we do not want the money now—there is no occasion to pay it.”
Sums of money were immediately offered us, and people then began
to have confidence to use the notes which they had. Before the week:
was over, we had to go and ask the Bank, as a favour, to let us repay
the money which we had borrowed.
“Are you of opinion that if the government letter had been is-
sued earlier, any part of the pressure would have been saved?—I
have no hesitation whatever in saying that the severity and the extent
of the calamity would have been limited had that letter come at an
earlier period.”
In short, if the ease against the Act, in its influence upon the
transactions of 1847, be not decisive, it is difficult to conceive what
amount of evidence could make it so. We have, first, the body of
evidence put forward in the text, showing that, after allowing for the
effects of all other causes, there was a residual calamity which noth-
ing but the state of our currency laws was adequate to account for.
We have then a number of deputations from the first mercantile bod-
ies in the kingdom, waiting upon government, pointing to the restric-
tive clause of the act as the place where the shoe pinched, and urging
its suspension. We have then the experiment actually tried, and with
the most complete success. We have the necessity of the suspension
strongly asserted in the unanimous verdict of two secret committees
of the two Houses of Parliament, and admitted even by the authors of
the act. We have one of those committees passing a sweeping censure
upon the act, and charging it with a large portion of the evils of the
crisis. We have the other committee, composed chiefly of the framers
and abettors of this law, while it exonerates the act by a narrow ma-
jority of two (thirteen to eleven) from the same sweeping censure,
yet, with more truth than logic, approving of its suspension, and ad-
mitting that it is unfit to meet the ease of severe commercial pressure.
Yet, in the face of this evidence, we still hear it roundly asserted that
the effect of the act was greatly to ‘ mitigate’ the commercial evils of
that year; that in feet the operation of the measure was peculiarly
happy and beneficient, the cry for monetary accommodation a delu-
sion, and the issue of the government letter a superfluous imperti-
nence (see McCulloch’s Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 1800, p. 507.)
Five minutes before Moses struck the rock,?’ says Sydney Smith,
“there are men who would deny that the people were thirsty.” We see
the same denial may be made after the water has gushed out, and theAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/47
people have drunk their fill.
32. See Mr. Tooke’s evidence before Secret Committee (House of Com-
mons) on Commercial Distress, 1848. Q. 5477–8..
33. See Mr. Hodgson’s evidence before Secret Committee (House of
Commons) on Commercial Distress, 1848. Q. 94.
34. In the examination of Mr. Hodgson, confidential director of the
Liverpool Bank, before the Secret Committee of the House of Com-
mons on Commercial Distress, 1818, Q. 94, he is asked,—“With
regard to securing the convertibility of notes, what is your opinion of
the bill?—I do not think it has secured the convertibility of note at all.
The notes remained convertible up to the suspension of the bill; but I
believe that if the bill had not been suspended then, or some similar
measure adopted, notes would have ceased to he convertible.”
35. Evidence before Secret Committee. (House of Commons) 1848, Q.
287–8.
36. Evidence before same Committee, Q. 1934–6.
37. The following quotation is from the money article of the Times,
Oct. 2nd, 1847, and as coming from a well-informed and intelligent
observer during the progress of events,—from one also highly
favourable to the present law,—is well deserving of attention. On
recording the resolution of the Bank of England to discontinue ad-
vances on Stock and Exchequer Bills, the writer observes, “The natural
results of the measure adopted by the Bank of England, on the 2nd
September” (the lowering of the rate of interest one-half per cent.)
“have taken place to-day, and the city has witnessed another panic
consequent on the proceedings of that institution. Four weeks back,
in the face of a steady decrease of their reserve of notes, notice was
given that advances should be made on Stock, Exchequer Bills, &c.,
at five per cent, being a reduction of full one-half per cent on the rate
then current in the market. They now refuse advances on these secu-
rities on any terms. The Bank is always the first in the field to add to
the terrors of any existing crisis.” On October 8th, 1847, the same
writer remarks, ‘ How long the public will continue to tolerate the
accumulated injuries and disgraces which the Bank thus continues to
inflict on the nation, it is needless to inquire; but it is right that the
evils should be attributed to their true cause while they are in actual
progress.”
38. Mr. Hodgson is asked (Secret Committee of the House of Commons
on Commercial Distress, 1848, Q. 307), “You think the bank ought48/John E. Cairnes
to exercise a discretion, and not to act upon general rules?—I do
think so; in the first place, wherever circumstances affecting the state
of credit are at all brought into circulation, they cannot go by general
rules; they must take other considerations into account, and advert to
the probable state of things; I cannot conceive of fixed and absolute
rules being compatible with the intelligent administration of a bank,
and still less with the management of the circulation.” In another
place (same Committee, Q. 373) he observes upon the same point,
“Almost every difficulty we have to consider on this point drives us
at last back to a better administration of the affairs of the Bank,
because that administration cannot be mechanical: there must be dis-
cretion somewhere, and the point to aim at is to secure as much dis-
cretion as we can in those to whom we confide so important an office
as the administration of the currency.”
Mr. Horseley Palmer, approving of the limitation of the issue to
£14,000,000 as a principle of management for ordinary times, yet
considers that for emergencies there must be a power of relaxation.
“Then you would leave it (he is asked by the Secret Committee, 1848,
Q. 1954–5) to the discretion of the Bank to relax when they thought
fit to do so?—Yes, unless you saw fit to place any control over the
Bank in the hands of any member of Her Majesty’s Government.”—
”You would leave an unlimited discretion either in the Bank alone, or
in the Bank checked by a Government officer?—Yes.” In Mr. Tooke’s
examination he is asked (by the same Committee, Q. 5,392–3), “In
all cases the prudent management must depend upon the circumstances
out of which the drain arises?—Yes, most unquestionably. You may
try numberless experiments, but you must at last come to that con-
clusion: there is no system of banking that must not at last depend on
prudent management.” “Is it your opinion, therefore, that a large dis-
cretion should be allowed to those who have the management of such
important institutions?—Unquestionably,” &c. He then goes on more
fully to develope his views. It would be easy to add to these quota-
tions, but the above will perhaps be sufficient.
39. See Mr. Lloyd’s examination before Secret Committee (House of
Commons) on Commercial Distress, 1848, where this point is fully
admitted.
40. The following plan, proposed by Mr. G. C Glynn, M.P., in his ex-
amination before the Lords’ Committee, 1848, (Q 1,782–5), seems
deserving of attention. “If I were to offer any suggestion, I shouldAn Examination into the Principles of Currency/49
prefer leaving the whole responsibility of the circulation in the hands
of the Bank of England. I do not think there is much advantage in a
double responsibility, divided between the Bank and the Government.
But I consider it would be well that the Bank Court should have in it
certain persons not elected by the proprietors, who should be ap-
pointed under Act of Parliament for a limited time, or in any other
way which may be deemed advisable, not immediately by the Gov-
ernment or Proprietors, and not removable by the Government, and
that they should have not an absolute veto upon the proceedings of
the Bank Court, but that if they dissented from the majority, their
reasons for that dissent should always be submitted in writing, and
that they should be laid before Parliament, if Parliament saw fit, from
time to time. I should think that the introduction of these commis-
sioners, and their protests and influence, would exercise a very whole-
some control upon the body of Governors, and at the same time would
not deprive them of that power, of which, as representing the Propri-
etors, it would not be right that they should be deprived.” “Would
you add to those alterations any regulations with respect to the man-
agement of the currency with a view to the Exchanges, or to any
other circumstances?—I should leave that to the Court and to those
Commissioners to determine as they saw fit from time to time.” `’Do
you consider that these Commissioners should be persons not en-
gaged in trade?—I would rather they were not engaged in trade. I
think you might find people of experience enough not engaged in
trade, who were fit for the duty, but would not make it an absolute
condition of eligibility.” “Do you mean that they should be appointed
for life?—Not for life. It is impossible to know beforehand how far a
man may be fit for a position of that sort, and therefore I would make
the appointment for three years, or for some period, and renewable.”
41. The advantages of this method of acting on the exchanges have
been pointed out by some of the first authorities, scientific and prac-
tical. See Mr. Tooke’s evidence before Select Committee on Banks,
of Issue, 1840, Q. 3753–3777. See also Mr. Palmer’s evidence be-
fore committee on Commercial Distress (House of Commons), 1848,
Q. 2034.